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The Role of Scientists in Risk

Assessment*

Halina Szejnwald Brown and Robert L. Goble**

Introduction
An increasing number of scientists who would have once introduced
themselves as biologists, chemists, physicists, or toxicologists now call
themselves risk assessors. The term describes a professional activity, a
job or a social function. It also represents an ideology; a belief that a
society should make use of objective scientific analysis in setting its
agenda and in managing its hazards. What is it that risk assessors
actually do?
To answer this question, it might be helpful to define risk
assessment. Volumes have been written during the last decade, most of
them emphasizing one of the two "main lines" of risk assessment: risks
of chemicals or risks of large engineered systems, especially nuclear
power plants. We have been associated with an approach which embeds
the term in a more general frame of hazard analysis and hazard
management. 1 Perhaps the best known effort to define risk
* We are grateful to our colleagues at CENTED, especially to C.Hohenemser, J.
Kasperson, R. Kasperson, I. Palmlund, and 0. Renn, and to several anonymous
reviewers for their very helpful criticisms of earlier versions of this paper.
** Dr. Brown has a B.A. from Washington University and a Ph. D. in chemistry
from N.Y.U. She is Associate Professor of Environment, Technology and Society
and a member of the Center for Technology, Environment and Development at Clark
University. Dr. Goble has a B.A. from Swarthmore and a Ph.D. in physics from the
University of Wisconsin. He is a Research Associate Professor of ETS and also a
member of CENTED.
1 Hohenemser, Kasperson & Kates, Causal Structure; Kasperson, Kates &
Hohenemser, Hazard Management;,and Hohenemser, Kates & Slovic, A Causal
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assessment has been made by the National Research Council (NRC)
Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public
Health. 2 The conceptual model of risk assessment and risk
management proposed by the committee, while emphasizing the
scientific uncertainty in risk assessment and the role of science policy in
addressing that uncertainty explicitly, tresents risk assessment as an
objective scientific activity, distinct from risk management in its
exclusion of social, political and institutional values. The NRC model,
though posed only for risks from chemicals, is widely accepted in both
the public and private sector in the U.S. and it is the basis for
structuring much of the regulatory activity at the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). 3
The 1983 report had several impacts: 4 (1) It helped address
industry concerns that more coherence and consistency were needed in
regulatory programs. (2) It helped restore public confidence in, and
bolster the internal morale of the EPA, which was deeply shaken by the
initial years of the Reagan administration. (3) It defined the tasks
involved in performing risk assessment, thus shaping its overall
identity. (4) It stressed the overt separation of scientific assessment from
the formulation of public policy, thus reinforcing the image of risk
Taxonomy, all in PERILOus PROGRESS: MANAGING THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY

25-90 (R. W. Kates, C. Hohenemser & J. X. Kasperson eds. 1985) [hereinafter
PMLOUs PROGRESS].
2 NATONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENTIN THE FEDERAL GOvERNmENT
MANAGING'TE PROCESS (1983). Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science and Democracy, I
IssUE N SCL AND TECH. 19 (1985).

3 Russell & Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environmental Policy-Making, 236
SCIENCE 286 (1987).Yosie, EPA's Risk Assessment Culture, 21 ENVTL. SCI. AND
TECH. 526 (1987).
4 P. F. Deisler, Jr., Interface of Risk Assessment and Risk Management, in RISK
ANALYSIS IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSIRY, CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS AssOCIATION
SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 14 (1985). Deisler, Jr., The Risk Management-Risk
Assessment Interface, 22 ENVTL. SCI. AND TECH. 15 (1988) [hereinafter Risk
Management].
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assessment as objective. (5) It recognized the social need for resolving
the scientific uncertainties about hazards, thus giving the scientists
specific social functions.
From the beginning, however, the risk assessment community felt
uneasy about the model. Critics argued that the view of risk assessment
and management as totally separate and occurring in an orderly sequence
(with management always following assessment), while superficially
appealing, is far from what happens in "real life". It may, in fact, be a
wrong model for approaching complex problems that involve social,
political and scientific considerations: it has been argued that it would
make the field too sterile and routine and stifle the creative impulses of
its practitioners, 5 that it would result in addressing the wrong societal
problems and thus be irrelevant, 6 and that it would be inappropriate
on technical grounds. 7 The implicit assumption that risk assessors can
be value-free is also far from ordinary experience. 8 Indeed, many of
us got into risk assessment because of our values, a desire to be useful
to society (however we may happen to define "usefulness"). Finally,
external pressures on scientists to produce "hard facts", to defend their
positions publicly, and to actively advise decision makers often distort
the results of scientific analysis (the process called by Rip "fabrication
5 Hattis & Kennedy, Assessing Risks for Health Hazards:An Imperfect Science,
3 TECH. REv. 60 (1986).
6 Von Winterfelt, Four Theses on the Application of Risk Assessment in
Relation to Environmental Mutagens and Carcinogens,in RISK AND REASON: RISK
ASSESSMENT INRELATIONTO ENVIRONMENTAL MUTAGENS AND CARCINOGENS (P.

Oftedal & A. Brogger, eds. 1986).
7 Wilson & Clark, Risk Assessment and Risk Management; Separation does not
Mean a Divorce, in PROCEEDINGS OF TIE 1988 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY
FOR RISK ANALYSIS (in press).
8 Ruckelshaus, supra note 2, at 19-38. Lynn, The Interplay of Science and
Values in Assessing andRegulating EnvironmentalRisks, ScI., TECi. AND HUMAN
VAUES 140-50 (1986). Lynn, OSHA's CarcinogensStandard:Round One in Risk
Models and Assumptions, in THE SOCIAL AND CULUURAL CONSTRUCTON OF RISKS

345 (B.B. Johnson & V. T. Covello eds. 1987).
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of facts"9 ), or introduce a political element into the analysis, thus
making the separation not possible. I 0 Defenders of the model,

including the authors of the NRC model assert that the critics are
attacking a straw man: no one claims that assessment and management
can or should really be totally separated. The idea of the separation, they
argue, is essential if risk assessment is to function as an objective
scientific discipline. 1 1 More recently, Graham and co-workers have
proposed that these arguments are misplaced and that the real problem
lies in false expectations that scientific research automatically leads to
more knowledge and that, in turn, to less controversy. 12 Both of those
assumptions, they argued, are just as likely to be true as false.
The criticisms raise three issues: (1) Is the model general enough to
reflect the realities of hazard management? (2) Is the idea of separating
assessment from management so inherently flawed that it should be
abandoned or redefined? (3) Regardless of what model is adopted, what
roles should scientists play in assessment and management?
While the model needs generalization, 13 we consider only the
second and third questions in this paper. As supporters of the model we
believe that it is both possible and very useful to maintain a conceptual
separation between assessment and management activities. The main
argument of this paper is that the general dissatisfaction with the
separation in the NRC model stems from confusing two distinctly
different ways of talking about risk assessment - the conceptual
9 Rip & Groenewegen, Les faits scientifiques d l'epreuve de la politique in LA
SCIENCE ET SES RESEAUX 149 (Michel Callon ed. 1989); English version, The

FabricationofFactsfor PublicArenas available from the authors.
10 Rip, Experts in PublicArena, in REGunLKTNG INDUSTRIAL RISKS 94 (H. Otway

& M. Peltu eds. 1986).
11 Deisler, supra note 4.
12 j.GRAHAM, L. GREEN and M. ROBERTs, INSEARCH OF SAFETY (1988).
13 See, e.g., Hohenemser, Hazard Management, in PERILOUS PROGRESS, supra
note 1.
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description of steps in risk assessment and the activities actually
performed by the risk assessor. While some steps can and should be
relatively objective, value free, and characterized by scientific
methodology, other steps inextricably mix scientific and nonscientific
activity. Risk assessors have an essential role in performing the latter
steps; however, they are not acting as scientists when they do so.
Participation in such boundary activities produces role conflicts for
scientific risk assessors and often earns them criticism.
Three Case Studies
To support these arguments we briefly analyze three very familiar
case histories, ethylene dibromide (EDB) in food and water, nuclear
probabilistic risk analysis and emergency planning, and the release of
genetically engineered Ice Minus bacteria. The cases are chosen because
of their familiarity and the controversies associated with them; they
serve as benchmarks in the development of risk assessment.
L The EDB Hazardand EPA
The agricultural uses of EDB, most importantly fumigation of soils,
stored grains, stored fruits and vegetables, and grain milling machinery,
are regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA). 14 Under the statute, each use of a pesticide requires
registration which can be denied or cancelled if a pesticide presents
unreasonable risks to the environment (i.e. the risks outweigh the
benefits). The decision to cancel must be based on a thorough risk and
benefit analysis, open to the public, a process triggered by
announcement of a Notice of Rebuttable Presumption Against
Registration (RPAR).
The EDB story we have chosen had its formal beginning in
December 1977 when EPA, prompted by the alarming report from its
14 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988).
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Cancer Assessment Group 15 published an initial risk assessment for
EDB, Position Document 1 [PD 1].16 A notable aspect of that story is
the gradual change over time in the scopes of several consecutive risk
assessments for EDB. As summarized in Table 1, both the number of
pathways considered and the depth of quantitative estimation of cancer
risks underwent expansion.
The primary focus of PD 1 was on identifying major agricultural
uses of EDB and its key adverse health effects. Very little exposure
analysis or quantification of risk was attempted. In contrast, the risk
analysis published three years later in Position Document 2/3 [PD 2/3]
was far more detailed on both counts. 17 Three exposure pathways
were considered in PD 2/3 - consumption of contaminated fruits,
vegetables and grains, inhalation of contaminated air during application,
and dermal contact with milling machinery - and the magnitude of
cancer risks from these exposures was estimated for affected
populations. The difference in scope can be directly traced to the two
sets of regulatory needs of EPA that triggered the two assessments. In
1977, as the agency considered issuing a RPAR Notice, the principal
question, as dictated by the legal requirements of the enabling legislation
FIFRA, was: "Is the potential hazard of EDB sufficient to require
further risk assessment?" A sufficient basis for an an affirmative answer
was provided when EPA documented strong carcinogenic, mutagenic
and reproductive effects of the agent and potentially extensive
population exposure. No further quantitative analysis was needed at that
15 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND
DEvELoPMENT, CARCINOGEN ASSESSMENT GROUP, INTERNAL DOCUMENT,
PRELIMINARY CARCINOGENIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR ETHYLENE DIBROMIDE

(December 2, 1977).
16 Notice of Rebuttable Presumption Against Registration, Position Document 1,
42 Fed. Reg. 63,134 (1977).
17 US. ENvIRONMENTAL PROTEUON AGENCY, OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMs,
BTHYLENE DBROMIDE: POSITION DOCUMENT 213 (1980).
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stage and very little was performed; the notice of RPAR was issued
simultaneously with PD 1.
Once the RPAR process was triggered, however, the EPA
management problem changed. Now, the agency faced one major
question: "To ban or not to ban?"There are also two follow-up
questions: "If so, what uses, and how soon?" These questions required
a comprehensive analysis of the costs of a ban and the consequences of
no ban; hence the detailed analysis in PD 2/3.
Despite its broadened scope and greater depth, the risk assessment
in PD 2/3 did not include one of the most important pathways of
exposure to EDB - that of groundwater. That omission later proved to
be a serious flaw which subsequently contributed to a public crisis in
1983 and cost the agency in credibility. Although we can only guess at
the causes of that misjudgment, they appear to have included the lack of
groundwater monitoring data, the original narrow scope of PD 1, which
had little mention of that pathway, and probably the disciplinary biases
of the risk assessors. It is also likely that the lack of management
options at the time contributed to the omission. (Soil fumigation, the
source of groundwater contamination, was the largest agricultural use of
EDB and its abrupt discontinuation would have been a serious
problem). That the agency still had concerns that soil fumigation might
endanger groundwater is clear from its continued requirement of water
testing by applicators.
Based on the results of risk analysis in PD 2/3, its authors
recommended cancellation of three major uses of EDB: fumigation of
milling machinery and stored grains (immediately), and stored fiuits and
vegetables (delayed). The fourth use, soil fumigation, was to continue,
albeit with some restrictions. EPA did little to implement these
recommendations until the summer of 1983 when alarmingly high
concentrations of EDB were found in groundwater in Georgia, Florida,
I MK-Issues ixHeath &Sfety 283 [FWall 1990]

California and Hawaii. These findings dramatically altered the
management problem of the agency. EPA was no longer moving
through a procedurally predictable, if slow, regulatory process. While
confronting a new and poorly understood dimension of the EDB hazard,
the agency now also faced a major credibility problem and an
increasingly alarmed public. The agency's management needs were
two-fold - to assess the risks from groundwater contamination relative
to the fairly well understood risks from other pathways of exposure and
to act promptly. By September 1983, the agency issued an updated
risk/benefit analysis [PD 4]18 which, in addition to revising and
updating PD 2/3, contained a risk assessment of groundwater as an
route of exposure. Based on this analysis, EPA issued an emergency
suspension of soil fumigation, 19 followed by cancellation, by
February, of all major uses of EDB. 2 0 These steps are summarized
below in Table 1.

18 US. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION AGENCY, OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS,
EUYLN DMROMIDE: POSMONDOCUM
4 (1983).

19 Ethylene Dibromide: Decision and Emergency Order Suspending Registrations of

Pesticide Products Containing Ethylene Dibromide for Use as a Soil Fumigant, 48
Fed. Reg. 46,322 (1983).
20 Ethylene Dibromide: Intent to Cancel Registrations of Pesticide Products

Containing Ethylene Dibromide; Determination Concluding the Rebuttable

Presumption Against, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,234 (1983). Decision and Emergency Order

Suspending Registrations of Pesticide Products Containing Ethylene Dibromide, 49

Fed. Reg. 4452 (1984).
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Table 1
Risk Assessments for EDB:
Interpretation and Recommended Actions
Risk Assessment
Date & Management Management Pathways
Scope
Answers Reconmnded
Reference Questions
Options
Consequence Language
Action
Is risk
-RPAR
*Grain
-yes
.RPAR
12/1977 potentially
• Fruit/Veg. C, M, RJD* Qualitative
PD I
unreasonable *NoRPAR
*Work air
- Machinery
•Canel/
rin•Yes
-Cancel
12/1980 Is risk from
suspend
- Fruit/Veg.
Qualitative
-Yes
.Delayed
PD 2/3
any
some uses
Work air C, , R/D*
and
-Yes
cancel
pathway
* Machinery
Quantitative
* Protection
unreasonable * No change
-Yes
* Cancel
* Cancel/
*Grain
-Yes
Is risk from
suspend
* Fruit/Veg.
Qualitative -Yes
9/1983
any
some uses
Work air
CM RJD*
and
.Yes
Suspend and
PD 4
pathway
* Machinery
Quantitative -Yes
cancel all
unreasonable * No change
* Soil/
Yes
uses
Groundwater
•set
Keep Set tolerance
What to do
tolerance
some
levels for
2/1984 with tainted
level
<No new risk assessment->
grains, fruits
PD 4
food
* Destroy
Discard
and
food
others
vegetables
_ No change
• C, carcinogenicity; M. Mutagenicity; R/D, reproductive and developmental

Until February 1984, the principal issue for EPA was that of
continuing use of EDB in agriculture. Now, having eliminated all major

uses that contributed to its presence in foods and drinking water, the
agency faced a new question: What should it do with the huge stocks of
contaminated grains already on the market? Pressed by public anxiety
about carcinogens in the diet and by a food industry concerned about
financial losses, as well as being required by FIFRA to weigh the risks
and benefits of its actioris, the agency chose to address this question in
February and March by setting tolerance levels for EDB in foods.2 1
21 Ethylene Dibromide: Proposed Revocation of Exemption From the Requirement
I RISK- Issuesin Health &Safety 283 [Fall 19901

The previously completed risk assessment, [PD 4], was sufficiently
detailed to serve as the basis for deriving the tolerance levels, and no
new risk assessment was therefore performed.
The EDB case history shows that the scope of EDB risk assessment
was developed over time in response to several discrete forces. These
included. statutory requirements, pressing management questions of the
agency (many generated by social pressures), availability and methods
of analysis, and, quite likely, the management options available and the
disciplinary biases of the assessors. The breadth and complexity of each
of the risk assessments mirrored the management questions facing EPA
at the time. To that extent, the risk assessments (though at times
criticized on technical grounds) served the agency's needs well; they
provided a scientific justification, a database, and impetus to support
several key policy decisions. The major management difficulties of EPA
were caused by omissions of important pathways in the risk
assessments and from delays in implementing the recommendations of
the assessors, not from essentially flawed analysis or from misuse of its
results. Our next case, in contrast, shows what happens when the
management questions are poorly defined and when the appropriate risk
assessment methodology is not used.
H. Emergency Planningfor NuclearReactorAccidents
Present day emergency plans for nuclear power plants are tied
closely to the Reactor Safety Study (RSS). 2 2 This study (also known
as the Rasmussen Report or WASH 1400) was produced in the context
of Congressional debate over the renewal of Price Anderson limitations
on nuclear accident liability. At that time, it was by far the most
of a Tolerance, 49 Fed. Reg. 6696 (1984). Pesticides; Ethylene Dibromide; Proposed
Revocation of Tolerances, 49 Fed. Reg. 8406 (1984).
22 N.C.RASMUSSEN et al., REACTORSAFETi STUDY: ANASSESSMNTOFAEIDENT
RISKS IN U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, 1975).
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comprehensive assessment of sequences of events leading to reactor
accidents, their probabilities, and the magnitude of potential
consequences. Despite a number of well-founded criticisms, RSS
remains a landmark in probabilistic risk assessment.2 3 The general
methodology has served as a model for many further studies of nuclear
and nonnuclear technology and has led to numerous successful
applications, most notably in developing safety modifications to nuclear
power plants and in modifying operating procedures. Nevertheless,
despite its general impact, the RSS risk assessment methodology was
not incorporated in emergency planning in the U.S. The history of this
failure, which was accompanied by a failure to adequately define the
management problem for emergency response, is summarized below.
RSS served as a focus for anxieties about large nuclear power plant
accidents. 2 4 It was not the first official discussion of such
accidents, 2 5 but it was the first to describe realistic mechanisms and to
gain widespread public attention. 2 6 At that time, the regulations
23 H. W. LEWIS et al., RISK AssESSMENT REVIEW GROUP REPORT TO THE U.S.
NUCLFAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION, NUREG/CR-0400, (1978). R. Wilson et al.,
Report to the APS of the study group on radionuclidereleasefrom severe accidents
at nuclearpowerplants, 57 REV. OF MOD. PHYSICS, S 1-S154 (1985). S. Sholly &
G. Thompson, The Source Term Debate: A Report by the Union of Concerned
Scientists (1986) (available from the Union of Concerned Scientists).
24 Hohenemser, Kasperson & Kates, The Distrustof Nuclear Power, 196 SCIENCE
25 (1977). Hohenemser, Kasperson & Kates, NuclearPowerin PERILOUS PROGRESS,
supra note I RereinafterNuclearPower]

25 An earlier document, WASH-740, in 1957 considered the consequences of a
major accident at one of the small experimental reactors then planned; this study was
updated in 1965 to commercial sized reactors, but was unpublished for eight years to
"avoid great difficulties in obtaining public acceptance of nuclear energy." U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THEORmCAL POSSBIL1TIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, WASH-740 (1957).
Mulvihill, Arnold, Bloomquist & Epstein, ANALYSIS OF UNrrED STATES POWER
REACTOR ACCIDENT PROBABILITY (Planning Research Corporation, Los Angeles,
PRC R-695, 1965).

26 Nuclear Power, supra note 24, at 228-233. D. F. FORD, THE HISTORYOF
FEDERALNUCLEAR SAFETY ASSESSMENT FROM WASH 740 THROUGH THE REACTOR
I RISK- Issues in Health &Sfety 283 [Fall 1990]

governing siting of nuclear reactors only considered smaller, so-called
design basis accidents, and there were no requirements for emergency
planning outside the low population zone immediately around reactors.
[Yet, the Nuclear Regulatory Commision (NRC) and the Federal
Emergency Management Authority did provide assistance to some
communities which wanted to plan on a voluntary basis.]
Public concerns about whether states and local communities were
prepared, should one of the core-melt accidents described in the RSS
occur, led to the formation of a joint NRC/EPA Task Force on
emergency planning. The charge of the Task Force was taken from a
request by a 1976 conference of State Radiation Control Program
Directors to define the most severe accidents for which emergency plans
should be developed by offsite agencies. 2 7 The Task Force further
refined that charge by targeting two specific management needs - a
specification of the range of accident conditions which should be
considered and a definition of emergency planning zones.
Conspicuously missing from the problem definition was any attempt to
specify precise objectives for emergency plans or to specific criteria for
evaluating emergency plans as they were developed. The methodology
chosen by the Task Force was to "base the rationale ... on a spectrum of
consequences, tempered by probability considerations." Surprisingly,
despite the prominent role of the RSS and the suitability of its risk
assessment methods for at least some aspects of emergency response
planning, the Task Force specifically rejected the use of risk
considerations for its analysis.
The principal recommendations of the Task Force, published late in
SAFETY STUDY (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1977).

27 Nuclear Power, supra note 24, at 228-233. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION &U.S. ENViRONMENTAL PROTwCION AGENCY, PLANNING BAsiS POR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE PLANs iN SUPPORTOF LIGHT WATERNUCLEAR POwER PLANTS, NUREG-

0396, (1978) [hereinafterPLANNING BASIS].
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1978, were to establish: (1) two emergency planning zones, a plume
exposure planning zone with a radius of 10 miles to provide protection
against exposure to airborne and ground-deposited radioactivity and an
ingestion pathway planning zone of 50 mile radius to protect from
exposure through the food chain; and (2) a definition of the potential
28
timing, magnitudes, and composition of anticipated releases.
A few months later, in April 1979, the Three Mile Island reactor,
Unit 2, became the first large commercial nuclear power plant to suffer
severe core damage. Although the accident proved to have only minimal
off-site threats to health, it forcefully demonstrated that the nuclear
industry, public officials, and the public were all woefully unprepared
for a nuclear emergency. 29 Responding to Congressional demands, the
NRC produced emergency planning regulations within a year,30 using
the Task Force report for a basis. These cover a wide range of planning
activities not discussed by the Task Force, including such matters as
notification and communications systems, mobilization for traffic
handling, preparations for decontamination and medical treatment,
specific plans for evacuating special decontamination and medical
treatment, specific plans for evacuating special institutions, provisions
for school buses, etc. The regulations were largely drawn from previous
31
NRC planning documents developed for the smaller, design basis.
However, they explicitly use the Task Force report to determine where
28 PLANNING BASIS, supra.
29 j. KEMENY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSIONONTHE ACaDENT AT THREE

MILE ISLAND (1979).
30 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION & FEDERAL MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND EVALUATION OF RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS,

NUREG-0654, Rev. 1 (1980).
31 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, GUIDE AND CHECKLIST FOR
DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RADIOLOGICAL
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS N SUPPORT OF FIXED NUCLEAR FACILITIES, NUREG-

75/111 (1975).
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and on what time scale these activities must be planned for.
The contribution of the RSS to the NRC emergency planning
regulations was thus primarily to set spatial and temporal scales for
planning. From a risk assessment perspective there are serious
omissions. Emergency response strategies are not compared for
effectiveness. The choices of size of zone and timing of response are not
justified in terms of risk reduction. Like the Task Force report, the
regulations do not provide clear objectives or standards for emergency
plans: What risks, with what priorities are to be addressed? The
regulations do not provide either an absolute performance standard for
emergency plans -

a specific level of protection -

or a relative

performance standard. The absence of precise objectives and of riskbased criteria for comparing the effectiveness of alternative measures
has meant that much of the detailed guidance has been converted to
plans which read like checklists rather than coherent organizations of
activity.32 Two important and relatively noncontroversial deficiencies
in the planning regulations would have been corrected using risk-based
criteria 33 - precautionary evacuation is not identified as a protective
action requiring systematic appraisal and development, 34 and the size
of the ingestion pathway planning zone is much too small, as was
glaringly brought home by the accident at Chernobyl. 35
Why did the Task Force restrict itself to a narrow use of the RSS,
32 Golding & Kasperson, Emergency Planningand NuclearPower:Looking at the
Next Accident, 5 LAND USE POLY. 19 (1988).
33 Goble & Thompson, The Use of ProbablisticRisk Assessment in Emergency
Response Planningfor Nuclear Power Accidents, in Proceedings of the 1988
Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis (in press).
34 laj
35 Hohenemser, The Accident at Chernobyl: Health and Environmental
Consequencesand the Implicationsfor Risk Management, in 12 ANN. REV. ENERGY
(J. Hollander ed. 1987). DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES oFTHE CHERNOBYL NUCLEARPOWERPLANT AccaDNT DOE/ER-0332

(1987).
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and why, especially, did it choose not to take a risk assessment
approach to emergency planning? It is worth remembering that the Task
Force worked at an early period in the development and use of risk
assessment methods. In the 1970's, issues were posed in the form: "Is a
particular risk 'acceptable'?" - and the answer was often sought by
examining comparable risks that were accepted. The Task Force
therefore assumed that using risk estimates would have obliged it to
compare nuclear emergencies with nonnuclear emergencies in order to
identify absolute needs and standards. The Task Force did not feel
comfortable with such an approach and therefore rejected the method
altogether. 36
...a risk related rationale might imply the determination of an
acceptable level of risk which is outside the scope of the
Task Force effort. Choosing a risk comparable to nonnuclear events, therefore, was not directly used as the
rationale for an emergency planning basis.
The alternative approach of using risk estimates for relative
evaluations of safety measures (including emergency response
measures) would be commonplace today but was not considered then.
For one thing, the power of risk methodology to organize safety
management according to effectiveness in meeting management
objectives was not then widely appreciated. Moreover the Task Force
did not see a need to go beyond its immediate charge. Finally, risk
assessment did not then have sufficient stature as an objective discipline
to command attention for such an application.
Why have these regulatory deficiencies not been corrected? Much
research and new information has appeared in the last decade concerning
accident risks and characteristics and concerning effectiveness of
emergency planning efforts. This work has found its way into federal
training guidance 3 7 and into a small number of state planning
36 PLANNM BASIS, supra note 27, at I and 2.
I RISK-Issues inHealth & ifely 283 [Fal 1990]

programs. However, the expert community largely lost control over the
processes of interpretation and review of regulations; these processes
occur almost exclusively in the realm of litigation. The only substantive
change in regulations has been the elimination of a requirement that state
and local authorities produce and administer plans, and the Task Force
report and original regulations are now encrusted with a series of court
interpretations. Litigation almost always dealt with new plants,
following the 1980 requirement that plants must have approved
emergency plans to receive an operating license. Litigation was, thus,
the last opportunity for opponents of a power plant to stop it. The major
concern of both sides in the proceedings was whether or not an
argument can be used to block the issuance of an operating license, not
whether safety can be improved. The expert community has not objected
very strongly to these developments: As a community, they
overwhelmingly support the further use and development of nuclear
power, and they have been persuaded (perhaps erroneously) that legal
challenges to reactor licensing need to be countered primarily within the
legal arena.
Our third case study shows how divergent the scopes of risk
asssessment can become when a much less closely knit community gets
involved in defining the management questions and what problems
appear when analysis and interpretation are not separated conceptually.
Also, the third case allows us to probe further the role of individual
scientists in all stages of risk assessment.
III. Ice Minus FieldTesting: Response by Three Agencies
Late in 1984, Advanced Genetic Systems of California (AGS),
informed the EPA of their intention to conduct outdoor experiments
using the ice nucleating inactive bacteria, Ice Minus. The full
37 T. J. MCKENNA et al., PILOT PROGRAM: NRC SEVERE REACTOR AocDENr
INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
NUREG-1201, 1987).
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chronology of the ensuing controversy, has been described by
Naimon 38 and by Krimsky and Plough. 39 Our analysis, based on
these sources, covers the period between 1984 and 1986 and focuses on
the risk assessments performed by three government agencies: the EPA,
the California Department of Food and Agriculture (DFA), and the
Monterey County Health Department
Table 2
Consequences Included in Risk Assessment by Three Agencies
for the Ice Minus Hazard
Agency

Orientationof the Agency

ConsequencesAddressed

EPA

Effect on environment and
population, broadly defined

Pathogenicity to plants
Pathogencicity to humans
Ecological disruption
Weather changes

California
DFA

Effect on agricultural industry

Pathogenicity of humans
Pathogenicity to plants

Monterey
County

Effect on health and welfare
of the local population

Pathogenicity to humans
Pathogenicity to plants
Ecological disruptions

The risk assessment for release of Ice Minus bacteria was performed
independently by each agency. Each structured the scope of its risk
assessment by choosing the consequences it considered important. As
38 J. Naimon, A Case Study of the First Proposed Field Test of an Environmental
Application of Biotechnology in the United States (1987) (Master of Science Thesis,
available from Department of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, University of
North Carolina).
39 S. KRIMSKY & A. PLOUGH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, COMMUNICATING RISKS

AS A SOCIAL PRocEss (1988).
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shown in Table 2, the agencies were quite selective in their choice of
consequences and differed from each other significantly. Their choices
appear to match the overall missions of the agencies and the nature of
the hazards traditionally addressed by these agencies.
The EPA, whose mission is to protect the environment from adverse
effects of human activities, adopted the broadest definition of
environmental threats. Because of the agency's determination that the
proposed test would be regulated under FIFRA, the AGS proposal was
channelled to the Hazards Evaluation Unit within the EPA Office of
Pesticide Programs. The scientists in that unit initially defined the
problem by identifying four types of consequences of concern: (1)
changes in the atmospheric precipitation pattern in the area by
depression of the rate of formation of water droplets in the clouds; (2)
pathogenic infection of commercial plant relatives of strawberries, the
intended target of the modified bacteria; (3) pathogenic infection of
humans; and (4) ecological disruption. The initial risk assessment that
followed was primarily performed by these scientists with an informal
input from various experts and from the EPA Science Advisory Panel. It
resulted in a decision, issued on February 1, 1985, that the company
would be required to obtain an Experimental Use Permit (EUP) for the
proposed test. The decision document also specified the questions to be
addressed in the permit application and the data needed by the agency to
review the application.
The EUP requirement was equivalent to requiring a comprehensive
risk assessment. That assessment was performed first by the company
in the application and then by the scientists in the Hazards Evaluation
Unit, who reviewed the application. These scientists also made a
preliminary decision to approve the proposed test. In the course of their
analysis the Hazard Evaluation Unit narrowed the focus by emphasizing
pathogenic effects rather than ecological effects of the Ice Minus

Brown &Goble: Scientist in Risk Assessment 301

bacteria. This emphasis was consistent with the mission of the Office of
Pesticides, which traditionally has been concerned with adverse health
effects of chemical pesticides. After a lengthy review process, EPA
granted permission in December of 1985 to the AGS to pursue the field
test.
The mission of the DFA, which was selected in 1984 by the state
legislature to regulate the agricultural applications of biotechnology (in
preference to the Department of Environmental Quality which is the
state-equivalent of the EPA), is different from that of the EPA pesticide
program. With strong interests in promoting and protecting the state
agricultural industry, the DFA was primarily concerned with workers'
health and with pathogenicity to agricultural plants. Not surprisingly,
effects on weather and on the ecological balance were given little
consideration in the risk assessment.
The scope of the risk assessment performed by the Monterey
County Health Department was the narrowest of the three. Its principle
focus was on human health, a choice consistent with the primary
mission of a local health department. The choice also reflected the highly
personalized nature of the problem once it reached the local level.
Abstract questions about weather were no longer the issue but rather the
immediate effects on neighboring communities.
The three agencies' institutional arrangements for performing the
risk assessments were also different. Although both the federal and state
agencies sought the counsel of outside experts, the EPA external review
process was far more extensive than the California process. At EPA the
results of the analysis and the preliminary decision were subjected to a
review process that included the general public as well as scientists from
the EPA Science Advisory Panel, other EPA offices, and other
agencies. A wide range of disciplines including meteorology were
represented in that review. The agency also gave more weight to the
outside expert opinions by encouraging free debate among the panel
I RISK- Issues in Health &Safety 283 [Fall 1990]

members and by seeking a consensus.
In California, the scientific analysis was delegated to a working
group of experts from four state agencies. Unlike the external review
process adopted by the EPA, the members of the California working
group had little interaction with each other. Instead of seeking group
consensus, the agency's analyst in charge of risk assessment collected
the opinions of the individual members and, based on his own
interpretation of the data, made a recommendation to grant a permit. In
short, the state agency did not seek to resolve the scientific uncertainties
either through public debate or through a consensus seeking group of
experts. Again, the differences between the federal and the state
processes are reflective of the routine modes of operation of each
agency; all major EPA programs are legislatively mandated to use
advisory groups and input from the public, whereas the state agency
practices a more centralized decision making process.
The orderly process conducted by the state and federal agencies
provided well defined roles for the participating scientists. These roles
extended well beyond the strict scientific analysis of data. In each case,
the staff scientists defined the problem, with input from the outside
experts, by listing the pathways and consequences of the hazardous
agent and by formulating specific questions for analysis. After
performing the analysis, the scientists interpreted its results by making
recommendations to the heads of their respective agencies to grant the
permits. In both cases, these recommendations were adopted, thus
strengthening the advisory role of the scientists in the process.
The procedure chosen by the county for its risk assessment was
much less orderly. The risk assessment and management functions were
consolidated in the hands of one person, the County Health Director,
who defined the scope of risk assessment, searched for data, interpreted
scientific information, solicited expert opinions, evaluated the economic
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value of the product and searched for management options. Because the
scientific debate was incorporated into highly adversarial public
hearings, the risk assessment took the form of contradictory opinions of
a group of experts who had strong individual preferences for the
outcome. Neither was this risk assessment a major factor in the decision
in February 1986 to impose a moratorium on all testing (first for 45
days and later for a year). That decision was based primarily on the
social, political, and economic significance of this case to the county and
had little input from the scientists. The minor role of risk assessment at
the county level stands in contrast to the EPA and DFA processes where
scientific analysis formed the basis for policy decisions.
Why was the county process so different from that of EPA and
DFA? Both politics and institutional circumstances played a part. First,
the county was indignant when the state and federal agencies issued
permits without giving county officials a voice in the process; this
provoked an adversarial position of the county. Second, the county
health department was quite unprepared to handle this unusual case in
terms of administrative arrangements or scientific expertise. The
authorities therefore improvised the process as they went along - while
being subjected to floodlights of publicity and a highly politicized
atmosphere. Not surprisingly, the risk assessment served primarily to
express the strong opposition of the county to the proposed test.
Characteristics of Risk Assessments and the Role of
Scientists
Even in the sketchy form in which we presented them, the cases
suggest three general observations about risk assessments in the public
arena. For presenting them, it is helpful to view risk assessments as
consisting of three conceptual phases: (1) definition of scope, (2)
analysis, and (3) interpretation of the results of the analysis.40
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L The scopes of assessmentsare usually narrow
The omission of the EDB groundwater pathway, the choice to
present an emergency planning basis but no emergency planning
guidance, and the differences between the EPA and California
characterizations of the potential hazards of Ice Minus are illustrations of
a general tendency. Narrowness in scope comes from four influences:
- Scientific/technical.Scientists may see certain problems as
intractable and exclude them. They may limit consideration
of problems when there are data limitations or other major
uncertainties. Also, the particular disciplinary background of
scientists may affect their characterization of problems as in
the Ice Minus assessments.
- Political/legallsocial.Regulatory authority often defines
the scope of an assessment, as in the early stages of the EDB
analysis. The traditional missions and constituencies of an
agency will strongly influence its approach, as was also clear
in the case of Ice Minus. And other institutional and political
considerations are often barely below the surface, as, for
instance, the conflict between federal and state and local
authority in nuclear planning.
• Managerial. Many risk assessments begin as the
evaluation of a particular management option - to site a
facility or operation, or to use or ban a technology, as in the
EDB and Ice Minus cases. Problem definition will be limited
unless there are opportunities for considering further
options.
Logistical.Assessments are made in fixed periods of time
with particular allotments of people and other resources, and
usually with only limited opportunities to augment the
existing data base.
A narrow scope is not altogether harmful. Such a scope may actually
strengthen a risk assessment by giving it clarity, reducing uncertainty,
concentrating resources, and by focusing subsequent analysis of
40 Similar schematic language could be used to describe scientific work as well.
However, in contrast to scientific work, it is intrinsic to risk assessment that both
problem definition and interpretation are necessarily nonscientific. Only the analysis
proper can be performed as a scientific objective assessment, uncolored by issues of
management prerogatives and social values.
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management options. For example, the problems with the emergency
planning basis could also be viewed as stemming from too broad and
vague an interpretation of the problem objective. However, when such
narrowing is performed for political reasons, with no regard for the
scientific evidence, or too early in the process - as was the case with
EDB in groundwater - or if it is not reevaluated later, it may lead to
bad decisions.
IL Scientists who perform assessments do
much more than analyze scientific data
The cases show that scientists who perform the scientific analysis
also perform other key functions: they structure problems, articulate
specific questions for analysis, arrange the external review process (and
give charges to expert panels), interpret the results of the scientific
analyses, and make recommendations on ways to manage a hazard.
These scientists have their own individual connections with the larger
institutional and societal context in which they operate, and they use that
context in organizing the analysis and interpreting the results. This was
particularly apparent in the Ice Minus case where the different technical
staffs were clearly sensitive to the missions of their respective agencies.
While many risk assessments can appropriately be performed in a
routine manner 4 1 our case studies show that creative technical analysis
by the scientists involved can be the major contribution (or potential
contribution) provided by the assessment. Thus, the analysis of
potential effects on weather patterns and the ecological balance in the Ice
Minus case broke new ground for risk assessments. Risk assessment
could have been used to improve the effectiveness of emergency
planning for large nuclear accidents had the Task Force chosen to
pursue it.
41 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, DRAFr SUPERFUND PuBLIC HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL
(1985).
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III. Scientists are often not involved infollowing up their analysis
resulting in uncorrectederrorsand inadequacies
While scientists played a substantial role in defining the scope of
each of the assessments, responsibilities for interpretation and use of the
assessments were less consistent and often limited. Nuclear emergency
planning is the most egregious of our examples: Failure to assess the
effectiveness of alternative measures are still uncorrected, and most
technical issues have been converted to legal issues. The EDB case was
mixed: The risk assessors produced a set of policy recommendations in
PD 2/3 on how to manage the EDB hazard; three years later when the
EPA had done nothing about EDB, and new management at EPA faced
a set of public crises, the recommendations were criticized as
insufficient. In the Ice Minus case, the EPA and California scientists had
a significant effect on their agencies' policies, when field tests were
approved. In this case, however, it is too early to say what further
follow up will be needed.
-

Risk Assessment as Part of a Dynamic Process
The picture of a useful risk assessment that emerges from our
analysis is an extension of the static, self-contained idealization of the
NRC Committee. Their ideal risk assessment is insulated from and is
followed in an orderly manner by the messy societal process of risk
management. It starts with hazard identification, which focuses on
consequences, and draws only on science. Their model is shown in
schematic form in Figure 1, below.
Problem definition in our picture (Figure 2) goes considerably
beyond hazard identification and includes consequences, pathways, and
other considerations including management opportunities. As shown
there, we regard problem definition as a merger of the interplay of three
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general areas: science, social/legal considerations and management
options. For the process to be useful, risk assessors must be able to step
out of their role as the interpreters of scientific data and, together with
risk managers, provide a bridge between science and society at the
boundaries where the two interact.42 In the problem-definition stage, a
risk assessor needs to advise the risk manager on the scientific tools
available for risk analysis, the availability of data, the extent of the
theoretical understanding of the scientific phenomenon at hand, and on
the relative feasibility of providing reasonably certain answers to the
management questions likely to arise. Risk assessors need, in turn, to
be advised on the management options available, on the potential
impacts of their decisions on the society, and on the legal and social
constraints placed on the scope of risk assessment. A similar mutual
interaction is needed in interpreting the results of technical analysis.
Although our picture of risk assessment modifies that proposed by
the NRC Committee (see Figurel, below), we preserve its key
elements: the central role of objective scientific analysis and the
distinction between assessment and management activities. Distinctions
are essential for maintaining the integrity in the process and for keeping
the science sufficiently isolated from value judgments and political
manipulation.

42 Risk Management,supra note 4, at 15.
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Figure 143
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Nevertheless, we argue that dividing the process of risk assessment
into conceptual steps should not be used directly to assign functions to
involved individuals. Whereas particular types of activities represented
by separate boxes in Figure 2 are placed in conceptually and
organizationally distinct compartments represented by shaded areas, the
individuals who perform these activities cannot and should not be
locked into specific narrowly defined functions. Risk analysis, to be
relevant, needs a connection with the larger context, and therefore the
people must be also a part of that context. Who is better equipped than a
well-informed scientist to interpret the results of analysis, with the
attendant uncertainty, and to convert it into advice?
43 Supra, note 2.
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Final Observations

For a risk assessor, a dual role clearly means a conflict between the
demands of a scientist's code of conduct - unwillingness to draw
conclusions from inadequate evidence, avoidance of subjective
judgments - and the need for her or his active involvement in solving a
specific societal problem. However, since the role conflict is
44 In our model, thin, solid lines represent the flow of information; dotted lines
represent the occasional flow of information; and bold, solid lines represent the flow of
activities.
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unavoidable, the best approach is to recognize it openly. As observed
almost a decade ago by Philip Handler, then President of the National
Academy of Sciences, grave problems arise when individuals confuse
these dual roles, problems of lost integrity and diminished public
confidence in science. 45 The individual risk assessor has several
responsibilities: (1) to keep track of the distinction between those
activities she or he does which are objective and analytic and those
which incorporate individual and social values and intuitions, (2) to
make clear the distinction to the public and to others in the field who
may agree or disagree on policies, and (3) in both roles, to perform the
work with sufficient clarity, openness, and honesty that an objective
characterization of any risk assessment will be feasible.
Risk assessors and other experts who form the risk community have
further obligations to that community and to the field:
• Critical review is often needed of how and by whom and on what
basis the scope and content of risk assessment is defined. In current
practice, external reviews are usually concentrated on the credibility of
the scientific methods and data base. While important, this type of
review needs to be expanded to include the questions related to problem
definition.
• More flexibility is needed in the interpretation and use of risk
assessment results. Very often a risk assessment provides a perspective
on a problem, rather than a definitive answer to a policy question:
results of that sort should be used as positive contributions to policy
formulation, not considered to be defective analyses.
- The institutions which sponsor risk assessments must pay attention
to societal context. There is a tendency to assemble panels of experts to
consider a particular scientific question, an answer to which may be
crucial in a specific policy decision, without giving that panel much
45 Handler, PublicDoubts About Science, 208 SCIENCE 1093 (1980).
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information about the nature of the decision problem. Such isolation,
intended to keep values out of science, may not always be the most
effective way of using such panels; cases where that is and is not
appropriate must be carefully identified..
- Risk assessors and other experts involved in risk assessment must
make a particularly strong personal commitment to the integrity and
development of the field: Support is needed for the development and
strengthening of the analytic base for assessment; the community needs
professional standards for what is and what is not objective analysis. As
noted in a recent editorial by Jasanoff, "honesty, rationality and full
disclosure are of paramount importance to science as well as public
policy."46
Most importantly, the community must become more willing to take
a critical look at its past activities and draw the needed lessons for
improvement

46 Jasanoff, Norms for Evaluating Regulatory Science, 9 RISK ANALYSIS 271

(1989).
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